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Taking Pride in International Human Rights Litigation
Beth Stephens*

Over the past 20 years, several dozen international human rights cases have been
filed in US courts. Many have been dismissed; many are still pending. A small number
have resulted in judgments against defendants accused of violations ranging from
genocide and war crimes to torture and disappearances. While few money judgments
have yet been collected, successful plaintiffs have expressed great satisfaction in the
sense of justice and vindication they have obtained from participation in these
lawsuits.
What does Curtis Bradley find objectionable about this litigation?' He asserts
that this is a dangerous line of cases, expanding rapidly, without proper authorization
from Congress. He views human rights claims litigation as a perversion of the proper
role of our legal system and a threat to US foreign policy. Bradley lays blame for this
serious misstep on almost all of the various actors involved in human rights litigation,
challenging their motives and alleging improper manipulation of the system. I will
argue that the litigation is neither dangerous, nor expanding rapidly-and that it has,
in fact, been tacitly endorsed by a modern Congress. Indeed, most of these complaints
have been raised for the past twenty years. Practice has shown them to be overblown,
if not groundless.
I. ROLE PLAYERS ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS STAGE

A review of the actors involved in human rights litigation shows that all are
playing their accustomed role in the US legal system, neither abusing their access to
that system, nor neglecting their responsibilities to the overall pursuit ofjustice.

Associate Professor, Rutgers-Camden School of Law. Professor Stephens has litigated international
human rights cases of the kind discussed in this article as a staff attorney at the Center for
Constitutional Rights ("CCR') from 1990-1995 and as a CCR cooperating attorney since that time,
and as a member of the Board of Directors of the Center for Justice and Accountabihty from 1993

to the present. She has also been involved in human rights litigation as a human rights monitor and
1.

activist, a plaintiff, an investigator, and a scholar.
Curtis A. Bradley, The Costs of InternationalHuman Rijks Liti ation, 2 ChiJ Intl L 457 (2001).
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The Plaintiffs: Human rights litigation, of course, begins with human rights
abuses, or, more accurately, with the victims and survivors of such abuses. A woman
escapes torture in Ethiopia only to find herself working at the same hotel in Atlanta as
the man who tortured her.2 Burmese refugees are thrown out of their villages, tortured
and enslaved by military officers working in tandem with a US oil corporation.
Survivors of genocide in the mountains of Guatemala discover the general who
directed the military campaign against them studying in the United States.4
In a more perfect world, none of these human rights victims would have chosen
to file civil lawsuits in the United States. But the combined efforts of international
and domestic legal systems offer very little in the way of enforcement or compensation
to them or others like them around the world. More importantly, civil litigation in
their home countries and criminal prosecution of those responsible are both clearly
impossible. Faced with no other options, each has chosen to file a civil claim in US
federal court. Moreover, each has had an additional reason to choose a US forum: the
defendant was present here. While this is not true of all such litigation, the majority of
lawsuits have involved US-based defendants.
Of all of the players involved in human rights litigation, Bradley only refrains
from criticizing the plaintiffs. He recognizes their limited options, and sympathizes
with the choice they have made in the face of those limitations. This is an important
concession: once the victims have chosen to become plaintiffs, the rest of the actors fall
into their accustomed roles in our legal system.
Plaintiffs' Attorneys: Victims of human rights abuses, human rights organizations,
and community activists regularly approach human rights litigators and tell
horrendous stories of abuse at the hands of repressive governments and abusive
individuals and corporations. More often than not, litigation is not an option, for one
or more reasons. However, in a small number of cases, the abuse constitutes a
violation of international law; the person, government, or corporation responsible for
the abuse is subject to the personal jurisdiction of the US courts and is not entitled to
immunity; the plaintiff wishes to proceed after a full understanding of the risks and
realistic potential of the litigation; and attorneys are available to handle the case.
Professor Bradley expresses concern about the impact of these cases on the
foreign policy of the United States. Indeed, his main objection to such litigation is
that it leaves decisions that may affect foreign policy in the hands of private individuals
who are neither bound nor equipped to make such determinations. But this problem
is hardly unique to litigation, much less to human rights litigation. The federal
government is often forced to disavow the actions of private citizens and to clean up
2.
3.
4.

See Abebe-Jira v Negewo, 72 F3d 844 (11th Cir 1996), cert denied 519 US 830 (1996). As noted infra
page 489, the Supreme Court has repeatedly denied certiorari review of these decisions.
See Doc v Unocal, 110 F Supp 2d 1294 (CD Cal 2000).
See Xuncax v Granajo,886 F Supp 162 (D Mass 1995).
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the foreign affairs consequences of their international adventures. US citizens who
commit common crimes abroad, business people who default on their obligations,
writers who offend religious sensibilities-all have the potential to create foreign
policy crises that must be addressed by the federal government. Such actions cannot
be curtailed without limiting freedoms that are basic to our democracy. Indeed, these
are the side effects of our individual freedoms. Messy as it may be at times, our system
has long sincejudged such problems to be well worth the price.
InternationalLaw Scholars: Professor Bradley notes correctly that scholars play an
unusual role in the development of international law. Lacking a global legislature or
court system, international law develops through a complex interaction of
governments, multinational organizations and scholars. The views of international law
"publicists" are acknowledged by both international bodies and by the US Supreme
Court as a "source" of international law.' He may be correct as well in observing that
human rights scholars tend to be supportive of the legitimacy of international human
rights law and international law in general. It is hardly surprising that the people who
choose careers in international human rights generally believe in the validity of the
enterprise.6 But federal court judges are surely as capable of evaluating the scholarly
opinions of human rights experts as they are of evaluating the competing experts who
come before them in any litigation.
Indeed, experience shows that the system works quite well. US human rights
cases are based on the Alien Tort Claims Act ("ATCA"), which states that the federal
courts shall have jurisdiction over "a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations."' The modern line of human rights litigation began in 1980 vith the Second
Circuit Fildrtigadecision, which interpreted the ATCA as permitting an alien to sue in
US federal court for torture committed in a foreign country.' Fildrtigainvolved the
torture in Paraguay of a young Paraguayan man; his family discovered the Paraguayan
police officer responsible for the abuse living in New York City, and successfully
brought suit under the ATCA.
Since Fildrtiga, federal courts have accepted as violations of international law
under the ATCA only the most egregious human rights abuses, as to which there is

5.

See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art 38(1)(d), 59 Star 1031. 10510 (1945) (listing
"the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the -arioas nations" as a source of the
content of international law); United States v Snith, 18 US (5 Wheat) 153. 160 (1820) ('%/Var the

law of nations on this subject is,
may be ascertained by consulting the works of jursts,, xiting
professedly on public laws."); The Paquete Habana,175 US 677, 700 (1900) (noting courts applying
international law may refer to the work of 'jurists and commentators ... for trustworthy midence of
what the law really is7).

6.

Indeed, there are few people within or without the scholarly community who do not support victims

7.

ofhuman rights who seek to obtain remedies for their injuries and to deter such abuses inthe future.
Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 USC § 1350 (1994).

8.

Filartigav Pena-Iralao630 F2d 876 (2d Cir 1980).
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widespread consensus around the world, such as torture, genocide, summary
execution, war crimes, and forced labor.9 Others have been rejected, including claims
based on expropriation of property and fraud.'" Professor Bradley points to the fact
that plaintiffs have attempted to plead such claims as evidence that this line of
litigation is out of control. Of more relevance is the fact that the courts have dismissed
claims as to which there is no consensus. As a result, in practice, the reliance on
human rights scholars as experts has led to the development in the United States of a
coherent, measured body of international law norms. This is a record of which the
community of human rights scholars, and the nation as a whole, can be proud.
The Federal Judiciary: US human rights cases based on the ATCA require the
federal courts to interpret a sparse, 210-year-old statute. Since Fildrtiga,dozens of law
review articles have attempted to flesh out the likely intent, current meaning, and
constitutional status of the statute. According to one interpretation, the statute
affords both jurisdiction and a federal right to sue; constitutionality under this
interpretation turns upon Congress's power under Article I to establish a federal
remedy for violations of international law. Despite its age, the courts have significant
evidence to support this reading of the statute. As legislative history, the courts can
turn to resolutions of the Continental Congress, which called upon the states to
provide remedies for those harmed by violations of international law." For
contemporary interpretation, they have an opinion by an early attorney general stating
that the statute provides "a remedy" for aliens in Africa harmed by a violation of
neutrality committed by US citizens. Thus, this reading of the statute as providing a
cause of action, as well as jurisdiction, is certainly plausible, and hardly an egregious
judicial creation. A second interpretation of the statute, as providing jurisdiction over
claims of international law violations and justified by Article III of the Constitution,
has also been hotly debated, but finds support in a long line of judicial decisions and
scholarly analysis."
9.

10.

11.

12.
13.

Although Bradley labels "forced labor" as an extension of the doctrine, it has been recognized and
condemned as a form of slavery for many decades. For a general discussion, see Sarah H. Cleveland,
Global Labor Rights and the Alien Tort Claims Act, 76 Tex L Rev 1533, 1569-73 (1998).
See, for example, Bigio v Coca Cola, 239 F3d 440 (2d Cir 2000) (rejecting ATCA jurisdiction over
claim that defendant acquired property that had previously been expropriated by Egyptian
government on basis of the owners' religion); Hamid v Price Waterhouse, 51 F3d 1411, 1417-18 (9th
Cir 1994) (holding that claims of fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and misappropriation of funds are
not breaches of the "law of nations" for purposes ofjurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute); Doe v
Unocal, 963 F Supp 880 (CD Cal 1997) (dismissing ATCA claim for loss of property).
See, for example, Edmund Randolph, et al, Report to Congress (1781), reprinted in Philip B. Kurland
and Ralph Lerner, eds, 3 The Founders' Constitution 66 (Chicago 1987). See discussion in Beth
Stephens, Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Congress' Power to "Define and Punish ... Offenses Against the
Law of Nations", 42 Wm & Mary L Rev 447,469-71 (2000).
1 Op Atty Gen 57, 59 (1795).
Professor Bradley and I, along with many colleagues, have debated the validity of the Article III
constitutional theory. Compare Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International
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Every court that has reached a decision on the ATCA has found the statute
constitutional. This is a remarkable degree of uniformity in the application of a statute
which lay dormant for almost 200 years. This consensus presumably explains why the
Supreme Court has repeatedly denied petitions for certiorari in ATCA cases-there
is no split in the circuits. This body of precedent is also an unlikely platform upon
which to mount a challenge to activist judges. While these constitutional theories have
been debated by scholars, they have been viewed by the judiciary as well grounded in
noncontroversial doctrine.
Moreover, the judiciary has been ever mindful of the foreign policy and
separation of powers implications of human rights litigation. Judges have requested
the views of the Executive Branch even where the executive has not chosen to
intervene. The KaradWic litigation is illustrative. The Second Circuit noted that the
administration had been put on notice of the case shortly after it was filed, but
declined to intervene. 4 Nevertheless, "[a]fter oral argument in the pending appeals,
this Court wrote to the Attorney General to inquire whether the United States
wished to offer any further views concerning any of the issues raised.'"" The courts
have departed from the guidance of the executive branch only in the rarest of cases."
As Professor Koh suggested early in the development of this line of cases, the
standard tools of checks and balances serve well to weed out cases that the executive
branch finds objectionable.17

14.

15.

16.

17.

Law as Federal Common Lan, A Crit~uc of the Modern Position, 110 Harv L Rev 815 (1997) (arguing
that customary international law should not be viewed as part of federal common law) with Harold
Hongia Koh, Is InternationalLaw Really State Lgw?, 111 Harv L Rev 1824 (1998); Gerald L Neuman,
Sense and Nonsense about Customary InternationalLaw: A Response to ProfessorsBrady and Gc!I nith, 66
Fordham L Rev 371 (1997); and Beth Stephens, The Law of Our Land: CustomaryInternatnra!Lat, as
Federal Law After Erie, 66 Fordham L Rev 393 (1997). A review of this debate indicates that. at the
least, there are cogent arguments in support of the position taken by the courts. It is thus rather
farfetched to find an example ofjudicial overreaching in the conclusion that Congress has the power
to afford federal courtjurisdiction over violations of international law.
Kadic v Karadyi6, 70 F3d 232, 250 (2d Cir 1995), cert denied, 518 US 105 (1996). See also
National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma v Unocal, Inc, 176 FRD 329, 361 (CD Cal 1997)
(court wrote to Department of State inviting views of 'the ramifications this litigation may have on
the foreign policy of the United States as established by Congress and the Executivel.
Karadi6,70 F3d at 250. The decision on the appeal was issued only after the Solicitor General and
the State Departments Legal Adviser filed a Statement of Interest supporting judicial resolution of
the claims.
In one of several cases filed against deposed Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos, the Justice
Department, in response to a request for its views from the Ninth Circuit, argued for a narrow
interpretation of the ATCA. Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Trajar v
Marcos, 878 F2d 1439 (9th Cir 1989) (unpublished opinion). The Court sidestepped the issue in
that decision, but in a later appeal of the same case, addressed and rejected the arguments rai-d by
the administration's brief Trajano v Marcos, 978 F2d 493, 495 n 1,499-503 (9th Cir 1992), cert
denied, 508 US 972 (1993).
Harold Hongju Koh, TransnationalPublicLaw Litigation, 100 Yale LJ 2347 (1991).
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Professor Bradley asserts that it is contradictory for advocates of human rights
litigation to argue that the courts will prevent excesses in this line of cases. 8 He points
out that such advocates-myself included-continue to push new claims, some of
which go beyond what the courts have accepted to date. He misses my point. I don't
agree that such cases threaten legitimate US foreign policy goals. I favor strengthening
human rights accountability both in domestic courts and through international
organizations. I believe that a human rights oriented foreign policy would greatly
benefit the United States, as well as the rest of the world. As a result, I choose to
litigate cases that might "expand the boundaries" of existing law. Sometimes,
unpredictably, the Executive Branch agrees with me, as in the Karad& litigation."
When the Executive Branch opposes litigation, the federal system has standard
procedures in place to prevent the perceived harm. Bradley would block the filing of
all such cases, regardless of the views of the Executive Branch-a disproportionate
response to a tool that offers one of the few options available to promote
accountability for human rights abuses.
There may be hypothetical risks and dangers in this type of litigation, but after
over twenty years of practice, Professor Bradley is unable to point to even one example
of a case that has caused a foreign policy crisis. I have intentionally set the barrier high
at this point, looking for a foreign policy "crisis" rather than a mere concern or the
need to explain our legal system to skeptical foreign diplomats. Such minor
discomforts are the price of our democracy, and a small price to pay for a democratic
contribution to human rights accountability.
Further, a review of the parade of horribles cited by Professor Bradley readily
discloses that the cases most likely to create foreign policy concerns are those most
recently authorized by Congress: cases filed directly against foreign governments
permitted under a new exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA")
only if the defendant government is on our State Department's list of terrorist states.
Indeed, he makes a rather disingenuous leap at this point of his paper, first
complaining about the alleged lack of congressional authorization, and then using
litigation against the government of Iran as his prime example of a lawsuit that may
have foreign policy implications. I agree that litigation against governments presents
the greatest risk of foreign policy consequences, but these cases have been expressly

18.
19.

Bradley, 2 Chi J Intl L at 472 (cited in note 1).
When our claims fall within standard US procedural and jurisdictional frameworks, however, I
expect the courts to review them objectively, as they would any case with international links. Thus,
Bradley unfairly characterizes the decision in Wiwa v Royal Dutcb Petroleum, 226 F3d 88 (2d Cir
2000), cert denied, 121 S Ct 1402 (2001), when he states that the Second Circuit reinstated the case
"despite substantial arguments" against personal jurisdiction and in favor of a forum non conveniens
dismissal. Bradley, 2 Chi J Intl L at 472 (cited in note 1). There were, obviously, substantial
arguments on our side as well, arguments that led to a unanimous panel decision, denial of a request
for a hearing en banc, and denial of a petition for certiorari.
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authorized by a modem Congress. Perhaps it is to Congress that Bradley should
direct his concerns, not to plaintiffs, their attorneys, or the federal judiciary.
Congress: The Legislative Branch of our government undoubtedly has the power
to regulate foreign affairs, including the power to create federal remedies for violations
of international law. Bradley acknowledges this, urging that the creation of such
remedies be left to Congress. But the federal courts have uniformly concluded that
Congress has done just that, instructing them to hear claims for torts in violation of
international law. Although the underlying statute is over 200 years old, and the
subject of much debate, the interpretation adopted by the courts is certainly plausible.
In the face of the Fildrtiga decision, the modern Congress has legislated in this
area three times over the past decade, and each time it has expanded the reach of human
rights litigation.' Professor Bradley responds that such actions are not an explicit
endorsement of Fildrtiga,although there is an explicit endorsement in the legislative
history accompanying one of the statutes.' But even putting that legislative history
aside, Congress through both its action and its inaction has certainly indicated that
the ATCA, as interpreted by the federal courts, raises no troubling constitutional or
institutional concerns.
As noted, Congress has in fact been far less protective of foreign policy concerns
than Professor Bradley himself. The amendment to the FSIA recently enacted by the
legislature threatens to put the United States into diplomatic controversies, and to
trigger exactly the kind of retaliation Bradley fears. If he, or the Executive Branch,
seeks to prevent such harms, however, they will have to take their concerns to
Congress, rather than pointing the finger at the other players on the human rights
stage.

20.

See Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA), Pub L No 102-256, 106 Star 73 (1992). coMied at
28 USC § 1350 note (1994), (creating claims for torture and summary execution by ctizens as well
as aliens); Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992. Pub L No 102-572 105 Star 4505, 4522.
codified at 18 USC § 2333(a) (authorizing suit by a US national injured by 'an act of mternaional
terrorism"); and the "terrorist state" exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. 28 USC §
1605(a)(7) (1994 & Supp 1998) (authorizing suit for certain human rights violatons agatint
sovereign states if those states are listed on the State Department's list of terrorist states).

21.

The legislative history of the TVPA offers support for the Ftldrtrga Courtes interpretation of the

ATCA and stresses that the TVPA was not intended to supersede the ATCA. See HR Rep No
22.

367,102d Cong. 2d Sess 2-3 (1992), reprinted in 1992 USCCAN 84-86.
As to the volume of human rights cases-no more than several dozen over the course of over twenty

years-it is an insignificant percentage of the federal court caseload. I would venture to suggest that
the total judicial time absorbed by all of the human rights cases together is still less than that
required by certain individual corporate cases. See in this context the remarks of ChiefJudge Walker
of the Second Circuit: "It is safe to say that, quantitatively, international human rights Law is not a
major, or even a minor, component of the business of federal courts: it is a mmuscule part of what

we do." Hon. John M. Walker, Jr., Domestic Adjudication of Intenattonal HutnanRiEJhs 'z:!atorj Unier
te Alien Tort Statute, 41 SLU LJ 539, 539 (1997).
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The Executive Branch: A final comment about the role of the Executive Branch,
focuses on the striking absence of Executive Branch efforts to undo Fildrtiga.With the
exception of one brief filed by the Justice Department before the Ninth Circuit in
1989, the Executive Branch under several different presidents has (a) endorsed
Fildrtiga, (b) found no per se justiciability problems in ATCA litigation, (c) signed
legislation expanding the reach of human rights litigation, and (d) made no efforts to
undo Fildrtiga by suggesting repeal or amendment of the ATCA. It appears that the
Executive Branch can live with the level of control over these cases that it exercises
through the standard tools available to it. Concerns about separation of powers and
interference in foreign affairs have been remarkably muted.
This restraint presumably reflects the fact that concerns about the impact of
such litigation on foreign policy are exaggerated. As noted, Bradley points to no
examples of cases that have triggered diplomatic crises. China, for example, may be
displeased by the lawsuit against Li Peng, but there is no indication that the case has
had any effect on relations between the two governments. Finally, it is important to
note that even where the administration may make an effort to block litigation,
executive branch views on the ultimate issues may be more nuanced. For example, the
Li Peng lawsuit 23 may have raised concerns in the State Department, but its
underlying focus--demanding damages for the horrific abuses against individuals
seeking democratic reform in Tiananmen Square-are consistent with US foreign
policy.
Indeed, even though, as Bradley notes, the Bush administration opposed passage
of the TVPA, President Bush endorsed the concerns underlying the legislation:
These potential dangers, however, do not concern the fundamental goals that this
legislation seeks to advance. In this new era, in which countries throughout the
world are turning to democratic institutions and the rule of law, we must maintain
and strengthen our commitment to ensuring that human rights are respected
everywhere.24
Litigation by individual plaintiffs may be at times a messy means by which to
achieve accountability, but it serves a crucial purpose. Its limitations can be lived with
in the pursuit of a world free of human rights abuses.
II. THE MODEST GOALS AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF US HUMAN RIGHTS
LITIGATION

The US legal system is, in many ways, unique in the world. More than any other
society, we use the courts as a forum for resolution of problems large and small, a

23.
24.

See Zbou v Li Peng, No 00 Civ 6446 (WHP) (filed SDNY Aug 28,2000).
Statement of President George Bush upon Signing HR 2092, 28 Weekly Comp Pres Doc, 465, 466
(Mar 16, 1992).
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means to address major policy issues as well as individual complaints. This reliance on
the judiciary is in part the result of widely acknowledged strengths: our independent
judiciary is capable of resolving private disputes and challenging official wrongdoing.
Even the most controversial decisions are routinely obeyed. The availability of this
neutral arbiter has been central to the development of our complex social and
economic structures. Despite debates about the huge volume of litigation in our
society, the benefits of living in a society with a reliable judiciary redound to us all. I
lay out this well-known background in order to place international human rights
litigation in US courts in this broader context. Human rights litigation is just one
example of an area in which the United States can be proud to lead the way.'
Victims of human rights abuses and their advocates fight an uphill battle,
looking for the cracks through which they can slip their claims in an effort to find
some means to seek justice, hold those responsible accountable, and help prevent such
abuses in the future. Closing the US system would require a sharp break with our
generally accepted rules and patterns. Distorting our legal principles to keep these
people out of our courts would be a disservice not just to them, but to our legal
traditions and to our democracy. It has been my privilege to help some of these
individuals develop remedies under US law for what they have suffered.

25.

Michael Bazyler has praised the US legal system for its ability to resolve claims arising our of the
Holocaust:
the last opportunty
century presents
of the twentieth
suits atofthe
of such
The filing
ina court of law
grieances heard
to have their
Holocaust
thedose
survivors
elderly

for the

... [Als with almost all transnational litigation, the highly-developed and expansive
system ofjustice in this country suggests that the United States remains the best forum
for the disposition of such claims. Tt is a tribute to the U.S. system ofjustice that our

courts can handle claims that originated over fifty years ago inanother part of the world.

Michael J. Bazyler, Nurenzberg in Arnica: Litigatbg the Hke:aust u Unred States Ccusr, 34 U
Richmond L Rev 1,8-9 (2000) (footnotes omitted).
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